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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-ROADBLOCKS-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that systematic, non-
discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks conducted by the police
to maintain highway safety by disclosing license, registration, and
equipment violations do not offend the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Commonwealth v Blouse, 531 Pa 167, 611 A2d 1177 (1992).
During the evening of August 20, 1987, the Penn Township Po-
lice Department ("the police") conducted a traffic-check roadblock
in York County, Pennsylvania, to detect license, registration, and
equipment ("status") violations.1 The police shift commander au-
thorized the roadblock in accordance with written department pol-
icy and section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.2 The
shift commander determined the location of the roadblock based
on previous department experience, which showed a high incidence
of status violations while performing routine stops in the evening
on a particular road.3 Pursuant to department policy and the Vehi-
cle Code, the police positioned warning flares, traffic cones, and po-
lice units on both sides of the highway and stopped every car in
both directions.' An officer stopped Michael G. Blouse ("the de-
fendant") at the checkpoint, discovered his operating privilege was
suspended, and cited him for the violation.6
1. Commonwealth v Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec 62 (Pa Corn P1, York Cty 1988),
aff'd, 390 Pa Super 650, 561 A2d 816 (1989), aff'd, 531 Pa 167, 611 A2d 1177 (1992).
2. Commonwealth v Blouse, 531 Pa 167, 611 A2d 1177, 1180 (1992). Section 6308(b)
of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or
drivers or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title,
he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehi-
cle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the of-
ficer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6308(b) (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
3. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1180.
4. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 62.
5. Id. Section 1543(a) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part,
that:
any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Common-
wealth after the commencement of a suspension, revocation or cancellation of the
operating privilege and before the operating privilege has been restored is guilty of a
summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of $200.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1543(a) (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992). The defendant was also cited
for an expired vehicle registration, pursuant to section 1301 of the Vehicle Code, which was
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In a hearing before the district magistrate,6 the defendant moved
to dismiss the charge' and argued that the statute authorizing sys-
tematic vehicle-checking programs and the manner in which the
police conducted this roadblock violated Article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The district magistrate deferred the
motion to dismiss until necessary testimony was presented at trial
before the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, 9
where the defendant was convicted of the summary offense. 10
On appeal to the court of common pleas, the defendant's motion
to dismiss was denied and he was found guilty of driving while his
operating privilege was suspended11 and fined two-hundred dol-
lars.1" Looking to the dicta of Commonwealth v Tarbert,13 the trial
not at issue. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 62.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appeliant at 2, Blouse, 611 A2d 1177 (1992). Rule 90 of the Pennsylva-
nia Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect
in form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the
procedures of this Chapter, unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclu-
sion of the summary trial and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.
PaRCrP 90.
8. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1178. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any
person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
9. Rule 86(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Appeals From Sum-
mary Judgments, in pertinent part, provides: "When a defendant appeals after a conviction
by an issuing authority in any summary proceeding,. . . the case shall be heard de novo by
the appropriate division of the court of common pleas as the present judge shall direct."
PaRCrP 86(f) (emphasis added).
10. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 62. Section 106(c) of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code provides:
An offense defined by this title constitutes a summary offense if:
(1) it is so designated in this title, or in a statute other than this title; or
(2) if a person convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
the maximum of which is not more than 90 days.
18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 106(c) (Purdon 1983).
11. 75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1543 (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992).
12. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 65. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
defendant stipulated that he was, in fact, driving under a suspended license, and later de-
fendant's counsel agreed that if the motion was dismissed he could be found guilty of the
offense. Id.
13. 517 Pa 277, 535 A2d 1035 (1987). The Tarbert court framed the issue as whether
systematic roadblocks conducted to stop and observe drivers to determine if they are driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol is constitutional under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution or, alternatively, whether such roadblocks are unlawful because they lack
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court held that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania impliedly
found the newly amended section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code
14
constitutional under Pennsylvania's police powers1 rather than
under the search and seizure provision16 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.1 7 The trial court limited the defendant's constitutional
challenge of the statute to whether the legislature exceeded the
scope of the Commonwealth's police powers.1 ' The court, subse-
quently, found the statutorily authorized actions were within the
scope of such powers.' 9 However, in evaluating the manner in
which the police conducted the roadblock, the trial court looked to
the search and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution °
statutory authorization. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1037.
At the time of the roadblocks in controversy in Tarbert, the language of section 6308(b) of
the Vehicle Code prior to the 1985 amendment controlled (see note 14 for statutory lan-
guage). In Tarbert, the court found that under the express language of the pre-1985 statute,
a police officer must have "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect" a Vehicle Code
violation. Id at 1044. Therefore, the court concluded, in Tarbert, that vehicle stops at the
roadblock, made without probable cause, were unlawful. Id at 1045.
Referring to the amended statute, which was not at issue, the Tarbert court proffered that
the state, under its police powers, may conduct systematic roadblocks substantially comply-
ing with stated guidelines to reduce the intrusiveness of a drunk-driver roadblock to a con-
stitutionally acceptable level. Id at 1043, 1045. See note 127 for the Tarbert guidelines.
14. As indicated by The Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 1985
amendment affected section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code as follows:
Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehi-
cles or drivers or has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of
this title, he may stop.a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of [inspect-
ing the vehicle as to its equipment and operation, or] checking the vehi-
cle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification num-
ber or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as
the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this
title.
75 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6308(b) (Purdon 1977 & Supp 1992) (bracketed language removed
and italicized language added by Amendment of June 19, 1985. 1985 Pa Laws 20, § 10).
15. Black's Law Dictionary defines "police power" as:
[a]n authority conferred by the. . . Tenth Amendment [of the United States Consti-
tution) upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local governments,
through which they are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt
such laws and regulations as tend to. . . secure generally the comfort, safety, morals,
health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing the
conflict of rights in the public intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to each an
uninterrupted enjoyment of all the privileges conferred upon him or her by the gen-
eral laws. . . . The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and state con-
stitutions, and especially to the requirement of due process.
Black's Law Dictionary 1156 (West, 6th ed 1990).
16. Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
17. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 63.
18. Id.
19. Id at 64.
20. Pa Const, Art I, § 8.
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and employed an interest-balancing analysis gleaned from Tar-
bert.2 The court balanced the state's compelling interest in main-
taining highway safety against the intrusiveness of traffic-check
roadblocks on the individual's privacy interest.22 Finding that sta-
tus offenses under the Vehicle Code are not detectable by a more
traditional and less intrusive means,23 and that the police substan-
tially complied with the Tarbert guidelines, 24 the court held that
the manner in which the police conducted the traffic-check road-
block was constitutional under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution.25
The defendant filed post-verdict motions 26 in the form of a mo-
tion in arrest of judgment27 and a motion for a new trial,28 which
were overruled and dismissed.29 On appeal, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's decision per curium.30
21. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 63-64.
22. Id at 64.
23. Id.
24. Id at 65. See note 127 for the Tarbert guidelines.
25. Blouse, 102 York Legal Rec at 65.
26. Rule 1123(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Within ten (10) days after a finding of guilt, the defendant shall have the right to file
written motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. Only those grounds may be
considered which were raised in pre-trial proceedings or at trial, unless the trial
judge, upon cause shown, allows otherwise. Argument, a hearing, or both shall be
scheduled and heard promptly after such motions are filed, and only those issues
raised and the grounds relied upon in the motions that are stated specifically and
with particularity may be argued or heard.
PaRCrP 1123(a).
27. Rule 1124(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "[a] de-
fendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of one or more
of the offenses charged by a: . . . (4) motion in arrest of judgment filed within ten (10) days
after a finding of guilt." PaRCrP 1124(a).
28. Section 135:188, Motions for New Trial, in Standard Pennsylvania Practice
provides:
The granting of a new trial in a criminal case is within the court's discretion, and is
not foreclosed by a decision on a motion to arrest judgment. Moreover, the court has
the power to treat a motion for a new trial as a motion in arrest of judgment where
the facts in the case support the latter motion.
In considering whether to grant a motion for a new trial, the court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
Conduct of Criminal Trial, 27 Std Pa Prac § 135:188 (Law Co-op, 1985).
29. Commonwealth v Blouse, No 314 SCA 1987 (Pa Coin P1, York Cty, August 16,
1988).
30. Commonwealth v Blouse, 390 Pa Super 650, 561 A2d 816 (1989) (unpublished
opinion), aff'd, 531 Pa 167, 611 A2d 1177 (1992). The Pennsylvania Rules of Court for the
superior court provides:
An unpublished memorandum decision shall not be relied upon or cited by a Court or
a party in any other action or proceeding except that such a memorandum decision
may be relied upon or cited (1) when it is relevant under the doctrine of law of the
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the defendant's pe-
tition for allowance of appeals1 and affirmed the order of the supe-
rior court.12 Justice Larsen formulated the issue before the court as
whether the use of systematic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary
roadblocks is constitutional under Article I, section 8 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, 3 when used to discover status violations to
ensure safety on the Commonwealth's highways.3 4 Recognizing that
stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is an undisputed
seizure subject to constitutional restraints, the supreme court em-
ployed an interest-balancing analysis to determine whether the
systematic roadblock was an unreasonable search and seizure pro-
hibited by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
3 5
The court turned its focus to the application of interest balanc-
ing in Tarbert3 and, while acknowledging the plurality of that de-
cision, held that it provided significant authority for the case at
bar because four justices expressed their view that systematic
roadblocks are constitutional. 37 Adopting the guidelines set forth
in Tarbert to ensure that an individual's reasonable expectation of
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, and (2) when the memorandum is relevant to
a criminal action or proceeding because it recites issues raised and reasons for a deci-
sion affecting the same defendant in a prior action or proceeding. When an unpub-
lished memorandum decision is relied upon pursuant to this rule, a copy of the mem-
orandum must be furnished to the other party and to the Court.
Pa Rules of Court, State, § 65.37 (West 1992).
31. Commonwealth v Blouse, 524 Pa 624, 574 A2d 66 (1990). "[Flinal orders of the
Superior Court. . . may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon allowance of appeal by
any two justices of the Supreme Court upon petition of any party to the matter." Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 724(a) (Purdon 1981).
32. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1181. The case was heard before Chief Justice Nix and Jus-
tices Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, and Cappy. Id at 1178. Justice
Larsen delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Papadakos, joined the majority opinion
and also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Flaherty, with whom Justices Zappala and
Cappy joined, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Zappala, with whom Justices Flaherty and
Cappy joined, also filed a dissenting opinion. Id at 1181.
33. See note 8 for the pertinent text.
34. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1178.
35. Id. The supreme court stated that, in Commonwealth v Johnston, 515 Pa 454,
530 A2d 74 (1987), the court determined the constitutionality under the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of warrantless canine-sniff searches based on less than probable cause. Blouse, 611
A2d at 1178-79. The Blouse majority expressed that, in Johnston, the court held, when
determining whether there was a search, an interest-balancing analysis is appropriate only
in situations similar to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968). Blouse, 611 A2d at 1178 n 1. See
notes 43 and 105-11 and accompanying text for discussion of Terry.
36. The Blouse court analogized the compelling state interest of maintaining highway
safety by keeping drunk drivers off the road in Tarbert to the compelling state interest of
preventing "mass carnage" by keeping unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles off the road.
Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179. See note 13 for further discussion of Tarbert.
37. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
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privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions at the unbridled dis-
cretion of the police,3 8 the supreme court concluded that system-
atic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks and section
6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, authorizing such road-
blocks, are constitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution.39
Further, the court held that the police substantially complied with
the Tarbert guidelines, and therefore, the manner in which they
conducted the roadblock passed Pennsylvania constitutional
muster."'
Justice Papadakos, while joining the decision, filed a concurrence
expressing his apprehension that the police could get carried away
and abuse their authority while conducting a mass detection inves-
tigation. 1 Papadakos acknowledged the public might have to suc-
cumb to the minimal intrusion of a traffic-check roadblock, but he
maintained that the "public has a right to be free from abusive
intrusion."'42
Justice Flaherty, joined by Justices Zappala and Cappy, dis-
sented, arguing that the supreme court in Johnston expressly lim-
ited the application of the interest-balancing approach to situa-
tions in which Terry v Ohio43 is analytically similar.44 Justice
Flaherty said the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the
Johnston search lacked the exigency requirement of Terry, and
therefore, the court rejected the interest-balancing analysis to de-
termine if an unreasonable search and seizure occurred.45 However,
Flaherty continued, the supreme court did use a balancing test to
determine whether a canine-sniff search necessitated usual warrant
requirements. 46 Flaherty argued that the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania found that while, on balance, a canine-sniff search does
not implicate full warrant requirements, nevertheless, the constitu-
tionality of such a search is a function of the existence of probable
38. Id at 1178. See note 127 for the Tarbert guidelines.
39. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1180.
40. Id at 1180-81.
41. Id at 1181 (Papadakos concurring).
42. Id.
43. 392 US 1 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that, in exigent
circumstances needing swift police action, warrantless searches are constitutional under the
United States Constitution provided that two criteria are met. Terry, 392 US at 19-20. First,
in weighing the government's interest against the individual's interest, the balance must tip
in favor of the government. Id at 21. Second, the police must have specific and articulable
facts leading to rational inferences that reasonably warrant the intrusion. Id.
44. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1181 (Flaherty dissenting).
45. Id at 1181.
46. Id at 1181-82.
Vol. 31:953
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cause."' Flaherty concluded that section 6308(b) of the Vehicle
Code violates the Pennsylvania Constitution because it does not
require reasonably articulable probable cause when conducting a
traffic-check roadblock.48
This dissent raised two additional points. First, Justice Flaherty
criticized the majority's reliance on the Tarbert dicta as preceden-
tial authority49 and maintained that such gratuitous prose is no
more authoritative than a group of law review articles penned by
the various justices.5 Second, the justice argued that the manner
in which the police conducted the roadblock was exceedingly and
unreasonably intrusive because they filled the roadblock area with
distracting lights and confusing activity, and thus, disturbed the
pastoral setting of a park at night.
51
Justice Zappala, joined by Justices Flaherty and Cappy, also dis-
sented, vigorously arguing that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
rejected the interest-balancing approach in Johnston.5" Instead, he
argued, the absence of probable cause determines whether a search
and seizure is unreasonable, and therefore, prohibited by the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 Further, Zappala criticized the major-
ity's reliance on the state's interest in ensuring highway safety in
light of the nature of the cited Vehicle Code violations."' Finally,
he noted concern over the dangerous and abusive extension of the
majority position. 5





52. Id at 1183. Justice Zappala, in his dissent, argued that the court in Johnston
applied the United States Supreme Court dissenting opinion in United States v Place, 462
US 696 (1983). See notes 117 and 118 and accompanying text for brief discussion of Place.
53. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1183 (Zappala dissenting).
54. Id. Justice Zappala's dissent includes an addendum listing the violations discov-
ered while the police conducted the roadblock:
1. Ten citations issued for license violations.
2. Three citations issued for inspection violations.
3. One citation issued for registration violation.
4. Five faulty equipment cards issued for no driver's license.
5. Four faulty equipment cards issued for no registration.
6. Two faulty equipment cards issued for state inspection.
7. One faulty equipment card issued for equipment violation.
8. One warning card issued for change of address.
Id at 1184.
55. Id at 1183. Justice Zappala noted the recent superior court decision in Common-
wealth v Metz, 412 Pa Super 100, 602 A2d 1328 (1992), which he viewed as an "obliteration
of a constitutional right." Blouse, 611 A2d at 1183. In Metz, the superior court affirmed a
1993 959
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To better understand the Blouse decision, one would benefit
from looking at the history and jurisprudential development of
search and seizure powers and their limitations. A broad search
and seizure power-first appeared in England after the advent of
printing in 1476, when the British government increasingly sought
to control seditious and nonconformist publications through the
nation's publication licensing system.56
Widespread evasion of the licensing system in the years follow-
ing led to increased government ordered censorship, harsher penal-
ties, and the reaffirmation of virtually unlimited search powers. 7
The Secretary of State issued general warrants authorizing and di-
recting law enforcement officers, at their own discretion, to search
for and seize libellous publications. 8 General warrants, those that
did not specify the place or persons to be searched nor the articles
or persons to be seized, largely contributed to flagrant violations of
personal rights.5 9
The American colonies, subject to the prevailing legal practices
in England, profoundly resented the rigorous use and abuse of gen-
eral warrants, known in the colonies as writs of assistance, to pre-
vent their trading outside the English empire. 0 This profound re-
sentment was one of the precipitating events of the American
Revolution and the birth place of express constitutional limitations
on the search and seizure power in the federal and state
constitutions."1
lower court's refusal to suppress evidence seized as a result of a driver's refusal to submit to
a traffic-check roadblock. Before reaching the roadblock checkpoint, the driver stopped,
turned and drove away. The police chased and stopped the vehicle. The superior court con-
cluded that attempting to avoid a systematic roadblock is reasonable grounds to suspect a
vehicle code violation or criminal activity. Metz, 602 A2d at 1335.
56. Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in
Constitutional Interpretation 21 (Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). The government controlled
publications, early on, by the crown through the royal prerogative and, later, by Parliament
through legislation. Landynski, Search and Seizure at 21. Empowered officials had broad
discretion to determine where to search and which publications were nonconformist. Id.
57. Id at 22. Penalties included the destruction of any press used for unlicensed
printing. Id.
58. Edward C. Fisher, Search and Seizure 2-3 (Nw U, 1970).
59. Fisher, Search and Seizure at 3 (cited in note 58).
60. John Wesley Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 1.3 at 6 (Clark Boardman Callaghan,
2d ed 1991). General warrants were typically limited to searching for nonconformist publica-
tions and expired when the evidence was found. Writs of assistance, which were customs
search warrants, did not expire until six months after the death of the issuing official. The
general scope, long life, and the lack of a requirement to return seized articles contributed
to serious abuses. Hall, Search and Seizure § 1.3 at 6.
61. Fisher, Search and Seizure at 6-7 (cited in note 58).
Vol. 31:953
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The constitutional limitation on the federal government's search
and seizure power became part of the Constitution in 1791 as the
Fourth Amendment,62 but remained largely unexplored until Boyd
v United States"3 in 1886.64 The issue before the Court in Boyd
was whether compulsory production of a person's private papers to
be used as evidence against that person in a forfeiture proceeding
was an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 5 The Court, linking the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,"6 said that an unreasonable search and seizure, pro-
hibited by the Fourth Amendment, is most often conducted to
compel a person to give evidence against himself, which is prohib-
ited by the Fifth Amendment in a criminal case. 7 While noting
that the forfeiture of a person's property because of offenses com-
mitted by that person was civil in form, the Court, nevertheless,
held that such forfeiture was criminal in nature. 8 The Court, rec-
ognizing no substantial difference between seizing a person's pri-
vate papers and compelling that person to be a witness against
himself," held that compulsory production of a person's private
papers to be used as evidence against him was violative of the
Fourth Amendment.
70
Twenty-eight years later in Weeks v United States,7' the Court
62. Landynski, Search and Seizure at 42 (cited in note 56). The Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
US Const, Amend IV.
63. 116 US 616 (1886).
64. Landynski, Search and Seizure at 49 (cited in note 56). The federal government
accused the Boyds of violating federal revenue laws by importing a larger quantity of goods
than what they were permitted. One of the statutorily authorized penalties was forfeiture.
Boyd, 116 US at 617.
65. Id at 622. The government sought the production of an invoice to show the quan-
tity and value of the previous shipment of lawfully imported goods. Upon the district court's
order, the Boyds produced the invoice under protest and lost in the district court. Id at 618.
66. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, pro-
vides: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." US Const,
Amend V.
67. Boyd, 116 US at 633.
68. Id at 633-34.
69. Id at 634.
70. Id at 638.
71. 232 US 383 (1914).
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explicitly stated the federal exclusionary rule implicit in Boyd.72
The issue in Weeks was whether evidence seized in a warrantless
search of defendant's home by a federal marshal, incident to the
warrantless arrest of defendant at his place of employment by local
police officers, was an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore, could not be used to aid the
prosecution of defendant in the federal courts.73 The Court, finding
authority in the Boyd link between the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, said that to allow the federal government to profit from the
fruits of illegal searches would be the same as striking the Fourth
Amendment from the Constitution.7' Noting that the Fourth
Amendment applied only to the federal government, the Court
held that property illegally seized by the federal government may
not be used as evidence against the person from whom the prop-
erty was seized, provided that the person seasonably requested the
return of the property.
75
The Weeks decision was extended in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v
United States. 70 The issue presented in this case was whether the
federal government may use copies of illegally seized documents as
evidence against the persons from whom the originals were seized
in a federal prosecution.77 The Court said that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not merely cover the physical possession of illegally
seized items but also covers any knowledge acquired from the ille-
gal seizure.7 8 To allow otherwise, the Court continued, would re-
72. Landynski, Search and Seizure at 63 (cited in note 56).
73. Weeks, 232 US at 393. During defendant's warrantless arrest at his place of em-
ployment, police officers conducted a warrantless search of defendant's home and seized
personal papers. Id at 386. The police gave the seized items to a United States Marshal who
returned with the officers later that day, again without a warrant, to find additional evi-
dence. Defendant sought to retrieve these illegally seized articles, but his petition was de-
nied. Id at 387.
74. Id at 394.
75. Id at 398. The Court limited its holding to federal officials and did not evaluate
the conduct of the police officers because they were not acting under federal authority. At
this time the Fourth Amendment was applicable only to the federal government and its
agencies. Id.
76. 251 US 385 (1920).
77. Silverthorne, 251 US at 391. While defendants were arrested and detained at
their homes as a result of an indictment, federal officers, "without a shadow of authority,"
went to defendants' office and seized all their books and papers. Id at 390. The district
attorney had the seized items copied. In response to defendants' seasonable petition, the
district court ordered the return of the originals but impounded the copies. Using knowl-
edge acquired from the copies, the district attorney framed a new indictment. Defendants
refused to comply with the subsequent subpoenas and court order to produce the originals.
Id at 391.
78. Id at 391-92.
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duce the application of the Fourth Amendment to form over
substance.79
In Boyd and Weeks, the articles that the respective defendants
sought to be returned were private papers and documents. How-
ever the items sought by defendants in Carroll v United States0
were contraband. The issue in Carroll was whether the warrantless
search for and seizure of contraband articles in the course of trans-
portation is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 1 The Court
said that Boyd turned not on whether a reasonable search could be
made without a warrant, but rather, on whether the government
could seize private books and papers without a warrant.82 The gov-
ernment, while not-entitled to the possession of private papers, was
entitled to possession of contraband goods. 3 The Court held that a
warrantless search for and seizure of contraband goods located in a
vehicle is reasonable, and therefore, permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, provided that the search and seizure was predicated
on probable cause.84
The Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne, and Carroll line of cases pri-
marily dealt with the fruit of searches and the use of such fruit.
The next line of cases focused on the fruit pickers and the use of
the fruit they have picked. Byars v United States85 provided a
convenient vehicle for the Court to reexamine the limitation in
Weeks that the Fourth Amendment only applied to Federal ac-
tion.8 The issue before the Court in Byars was whether a federal
agent's participation in a state initiated search violated the Fourth
Amendment. 7 Noting that mere participation of a federal agent in
79. Id at 392.
80. 267 US 132 (1925).
81. Carroll, 267 US at 149. Without a warrant, but with probable .cause, federal pro-
hibition agents searched defendants' car, seized contraband alcohol, and arrested defend-
ants. Id at 136. The National Prohibition Act authorized the governmental seizure and de-
struction of liquor. Id at 143. The Court found that under this act and a supplemental act,
congress lessened search warrant requirements for property other than private dwellings,
such as vehicles. Id at 147.
82. Id at 149.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court defined probable cause as "the seizing officer's belief, reasonably
based on circumstances known by the officer, that a vehicle contained contraband items
subject to seizure and destruction. Id.
85. 273 US 28 (1927).
86. See note 75 and accompanying text.
87. Byars, 273 US at 32. Pursuant to a state issued search warrant, state officers
searched defendant's property looking for evidence of a federal prohibition law violation. Id
at 29. A federal prohibition agent assisted in the search as requested by the state agents. Id
at 30. The warrant directed the search for liquor and instruments of liquor manufacture. Id
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a state-initiated search does not make the search a federal under-
taking, the Court cautioned that judicial vigilance should be the
guide to detect circuitous violations of the Constitution.8
The state's use in a state trial of illegally seized evidence was
challenged in Wolf v Colorado.89 The issue before the United
States Supreme Court was whether a state court conviction vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process of
law ° because evidence admitted at trial would have been inadmis-
sible in the federal courts as violative of the Fourth Amendment. 1
The Court determined that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures was fundamental to a free
society and implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty."92 There-
fore, the Supreme Court held that the states were bound by the
Fourth Amendment through the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.9 3 However, the Court recognized that there
were a variety of methods to protect the individual from unreason-
able searches and seizures " and did not bind the states to the ex-
clusionary rule95 with respect to evidence that state agents illegally
seized."6
The tension between those who picked the fruit and those who
may use the fruit continued in Elkins v United States.7 Here, the
Court reexamined the exclusionary rule to determine whether evi-
at 29. Counterfeit whiskey bottle stamps were discovered instead and were turned over to
the federal agent. Id at 31. No state prosecution was ever pursued. Id. Defendant was tried
and convicted in the federal courts for possession of the counterfeit stamps. Id at 28. How-
ever, the state issued search warrant clearly would not have withstood federal constitutional
muster, if it had been issued by the federal government. Id at 29.
88. Id at 32. The Court determined that the federal officer actively participated in
the search as an agent of the federal government, and therefore, the search and seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id at 33.
89. 338 US 25 (1949).
90. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
US Const, Amend .XIV, § 1.
91. Wolf, 338 US at 25-26. See note 62 for text of the Fourth Amendment.
92. Id at 27.
93. Id at 27-28.
94. The Court noted the existence of common law actions to recover damages as a
result of an illegal search, as well as statutory criminal sanctions and civil remedies. Id at
30-31 n 1.
95. See note 75 and accompanying text.
96. Wolf, 338 US at 33.
97. 364 US 206 (1960).
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dence seized exclusively and illegally by state officers could be used
in a federal criminal prosecution.98 Acknowledging past admissibil-
ity of such evidence, but recognizing that federal courts must up-
hold judicial integrity and the Constitution, the Court held that
evidence obtained by non-federal agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment was no longer admissible in a federal criminal trial.99
Revisiting its decision in Wolf °° in Mapp v Ohio,10 the Su-
preme Court reexamined whether evidence seized by a state agent
in 'violation of the Fourth Amendment was admissible in a state
criminal trial.'02 The Court noted that methods to protect privacy
rights, other than the Amendment protection, have been largely
futile.103 Subsequently, the Court, abandoning its previous position
in Wolf, reasoned that since the exclusionary rule was a fundamen-
tal part of the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy and since this
amendment was binding on the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were also bound
by the exclusionary rule.104
The previous two lines of cases have largely looked at the pa-
rameters of the exclusionary rule with respect to illegally seized
98. Elkins, 364 US at 208. Defendants were convicted in federal court after moving to
suppress evidence they asserted was illegally seized by state agents. Id at 206-07. The dis-
trict judge, who assumed without deciding that the items were illegally seized, denied the
motion on the grounds that federal agents had neither participated in, nor had knowledge
of, the search prior to its execution. Id at 207.
99. Id at 223. The Elkins court looked to the eloquence of Justice Brandeis to illus-
trate the imperative of judicial integrity:
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Id at 222-23 citing Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting).
100. See notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
101. 367 US 643 (1961).
102. Mapp, 367 US at 645-46. Police officers, without a warrant, arrived at defendant's
home pursuant to information that a person wanted for questioning was hiding somewhere
in defendant's home. Defendant, after contacting her attorney, refused to let the officers
enter unless they produced a warrant. The police forced their way into defendant's home
and defendant demanded to see their warrant. Id at 644. The police held up a piece of paper
purported to be a warrant, defendant grabbed the paper, and the officers roughly hand-
cuffed her for belligerence. Id at 644-45. The police conducted a widespread search of de-
fendant's home and discovered obscene materials. No valid search warrant was ever
presented in evidence and defendant was convicted in a state court. Id at 645.
103. Id at 651-52. The Court noted that less than half of the states had any criminal
sanctions for illegal searches and seizures. Id at 652 n 7.
104. Id at 655.
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evidence. In Terry v Ohio,10 5 the Supreme Court examined the pa-
rameters that distinguished illegally seized evidence from that
seized legally."' 6 The issue before the Court in Terry was whether a
police officer's search for concealed weapons to ensure his own
safety was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when, al-
though based on a belief that was something less than probable
cause and conducted on a public street, the search was limited to
the person's outer clothing.10 7 Since this case did not deal with the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Court focused its
inquiry on whether the search was unreasonable, and consequently,
unconstitutional. 0 8 The Court, employing an interest-balancing
analysis to determine the reasonableness of the search, balanced
the need to search against the invasion that the search involved.'0 9
While acknowledging that any search, however limited, is a severe
intrusion on a person's cherished personal security, 110 the Court,
nevertheless, held that the government's interest in preventing
crime combined with the heavy interest in protecting police officers
from harm tipped the scale in the government's favor."'
The Supreme Court has largely looked to the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution in evaluating search and
seizure limitations. However, in Cooper v California,"' the Court
105. 392 US 1 (1968).
106. Terry, 392 US at 20-22.
107. Id at 19. A police officer observed Terry and two other individuals engaging in
suspicious behavior that led him to believe they were "casing a job." Id at 5-6. After ap-
proaching the individuals and making inquiries, to which the men "mumbled" responses,
the officer patted down the outside of the individuals' clothing. The officer discovered and
seized concealed weapons. Terry's motion to suppress the weapons was denied. Id at 7-8.
108. Id at 20. The Court rejected the state's argument that a "stop and frisk" did not
rise to the level of a "seizure and search." Id at 16. With respect to a "seizure," the Court
said, "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. With respect to a "search," the Court said, "it is
nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration
of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a 'search.'" Id.
109. Id at 21.
110. Id 24-25. The Court described the search for weapons on a person in public as a
"serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment." Id at 17.
111. Id at 27. The Court concluded that a police officer may make a limited search of a
person for weapons if a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would believe
that his or another person's safety was in danger. Id.
112. 386 US 58 (1967). Defendant was convicted in a state court of selling heroin to a
police informant. The police seized evidence, without a warrant, from defendant's car.
Cooper, 386 US at 58. The car had been impounded in accordance with state law because of
the crime for which defendant was arrested. Id at 61. The state court, while considering the
search and seizure violation of the Fourth Amendment, held that the evidence was admissi-
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recognized that, while bound by the Fourth Amendment through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states
may afford more protection against searches and seizures under
their own constitutions.113 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has not hesitated to afford more protection to de-
fendants under the Pennsylvania Constitution than is afforded
under the United States Constitution.
114
A divergence arose in the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of search and seizure limitations under the Constitution
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of search
and seizure limitations under the Pennsylvania Constitution in the
1987 case of Commonwealth v Johnston.1 5 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was faced with the issue of whether warrantless ca-
nine-sniff searches based on less than probable cause are prohib-
ited under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."'
The supreme court determined that a canine-sniff search is a
"search" under Article I, section 8 and used an interest-balancing
analysis to determine whether the search required a warrant."'
ble under the California Constitution because the search was a harmless error. Id at 59. The
United States Supreme Court determined that the search was indeed permissible under the
Fourth Amendment and never reached an evaluation under the California Constitution. Id
at 62.
113. Id at 62. The Court stated this view to ensure the states understood that Cooper
in no way abrogated the states' power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures.
Id.
114. Commonwealth v Sell, 504 Pa 46, 470 A2d 457 (1983). The issue before the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in Sell was whether Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution affords a defendant accused of a possessory crime "automatic standing" to
challenge the admissibility of evidence alleged to be illegally seized. Prior to Sell, the United
States Supreme Court had abolished. "automatic standing" under the Fourth Amendment in
United States v Salvucci, 448 US 83 (1980). Sell, 470 A2d at 458. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the Supreme Court's reasoning in Salvucci and held that the search
and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution still affords "automatic standing." Id
at 469.
115. 515 Pa 454, 530 A2d 74 (1987).
116. Johnston, 530 A2d at 75. Defendant sought to suppress a quantity of marijuana
seized pursuant to a search warrant that was predicated on a warrantless canine-sniff search
of the area outside defendant's leased and enclosed storage area located in a commercial
warehouse. Id.
117. Id at 79. The Johnston court looked to the majority and minority opinions in
United States v Place, 462 US 696 (1983). The issue before the Place Court was whether a
warrantless seizure of personal luggage to conduct a canine-sniff search that was based on
less than probable cause was permitted under the Fourth Amendment. Place, 462 US at
697-98. The Place Court used an interest-balancing analysis to determine if a warrantless
canine-sniff search was a "search" that was subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions. Id at
702-06.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the Place Court's approach for application to
the Pennsylvania Constitution and instead adopted the Place minority approach. Johnston,
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The court noted that the usefulness of narcotics dogs would be lost
if subjected to full-blown warrant procedures, and also, that arbi-
trary use of the dogs by the police threatened a free society.
118
Consequently, the court adopted a two-part test to determine
whether a particular warrantless canine-sniff search was permissi-
ble under the Pennsylvania Constitution.119 First, the police must
be able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing drugs may be
present. 120 Second, the police must have been lawfully present at
the location where the canine-sniff search was conducted.
121
Commonwealth v Tarbert122 presented another issue that exem-
plified the continued tension between the government's interest in
using search and seizure techniques as a law enforcement tool and
the individual's interest in privacy. The issue before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Tarbert was whether section 6308(b) of
the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, prior to its amendment in 1985,123
authorized the police to conduct systematic roadblocks in order to
stop and observe drivers to determine if those drivers were operat-
ing a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, or alternatively,
whether such roadblocks were permissible under Article I, section
530 A2d at 77-78. The Place minority, through Justice Brennan, noted that the "Fourth
Amendment has already performed the constitutional balance between governmental inter-
ests and personal privacy, and Terry extended that balancing process only in special, lim-
ited circumstances." Id at 78 citing Place, 462 US at 718.
118. Johnston, 530 A2d at 79. While rejecting the Place majority rationale for holding
that canine-sniff searches were not "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Johnston court, nevertheless, adopted that rationale to evaluate whether full-
blown warrant requirements were necessary to meet the mandate of Article I, section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
The Place majority characterized a canine-sniff search as:
much less intrusive than a typical search. . . We are aware of no other investigative
procedure that is so limited in both the manner in which the information is obtained
and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.
Therefore, we conclude . . . that [the warrantless canine-sniff search] . . . did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 77 citing Place, 462 US at 707.
119. Johnston, 530 A2d at 79.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 517 Pa 277, 535 A2d 1035 (1987). The police, conducting a sobriety-check road-
block, stopped cars traveling in either direction and asked to see a license and registration
in an attempt to gather clues that would lead them to believe the driver was intoxicated. An
officer stopped defendant at this roadblock and, after gathering clues of intoxication, admin-
istered three field sobriety tests, two of which defendant failed. Defendant was arrested and
given a breathalyzer test. He was convicted in the court of common pleas, but the superior
court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the stop of defendant's vehicle violated
Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Talbert, 535 A2d at 1036.
123. See note 14 for the statutory language before and after the amendment of 1985.
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8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.""4 The court, looking to the
language of the Vehicle Code in force at the time of the roadblock
at issue, said that the police department's power to stop vehicles
was limited to situations where the police had "articulable and rea-
sonable grounds" to suspect a vehicle code violation.12 The court
concluded that, since the police exceeded their statutory authority
when they stopped the defendant without articulable and reasona-
ble grounds for doing so, the evidence seized pursuant to that stop
was illegally seized and inadmissible." 6 The court held that the
state, under its police powers and as authorized by the new statute,
may conduct systematic drunk-driver roadblocks that are constitu-
tionally permissible, provided that the police substantially comply
with the stated guidelines to minimize the intrusiveness of drunk-
driver roadblocks. 127 Although the applicable statute did not au-
thorize the police to conduct the roadblock at issue, the Tarbert
court evaluated the constitutionality of drunk-driver roadblocks
under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 12 8
The historical and jurisprudential journey of the government's
search and seizure power and the limitations on this power pro-
vides adequate illumination from which to view the Blouse tapes-
try as a whole. However, understanding the dissonance between
the Blouse majority and minority interpretations of Johnston and
their disagreement over the use of Tarbert will raise the viewing
light to a level at which we may also appreciate the threads that
join to create Blouse.
The Blouse majority clearly held that systematic, non-discrimi-
natory, non-arbitrary roadblocks used to ensure Pennsylvania
highway safety by disclosing status violations were permissible
under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and did so by balancing in-
terests to determine reasonableness. 29 Writing for the majority,
Justice Larsen midwifed Blouse from the marriage of Johnston
124. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1037. See note 8 for Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
125. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1044.
126. Id at 1045.
127. Id at 1043, 1045. The Tarbert guidelines focused on three areas: (1) the stop
should only be momentary for a trained observation without physically searching the vehicle
or its occupants; (2) unnecessary surprise should be avoided by marking the area and in-
forming drivers of the roadblock's existence; and (3) arbitrariness should be minimized by
requiring prior administrative decision to determine location, time, and an objective method
of choosing which vehicles to stop. Id at 1043.
128. Id at 1037-43.
129. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1178.
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and Tarbert in a marginally supported delivery.130 The table upon
which Justice Larsen delivered Blouse was supported by two legs
from Johnston and two legs from Tarbert.
The first leg the majority gleaned from Johnston was a balanc-
ing test to evaluate a canine-sniff search that was based on less
than probable cause.1"1 Specifically, Johnston established a two-
part test to decide the constitutionality of warrantless canine-sniff
searches. First, the police must be able to "articulate reasonable
grounds for believing" that drugs may be present in the place
where the dog sniffed for drugs."3 2 Second, the police must have
been lawfully present at the place where they conducted the ca-
nine-sniff test. s3 The Johnston court determined the police met
these requirements because they "articulated a reasonable suspi-
cion" that drugs might be present in the area they subjected to a
canine-sniff and the police were lawfully present. 34 The majority
considered the phrases "reasonable grounds for believing" and "ar-
ticulated a reasonable suspicion" as being synonymous and mean-
ing something less than probable cause."3 5 The Blouse minority,
however, saw these phrases as expressions defining "probable
cause."13
s
The heart of the dissonance over Johnston resides in the inter-
pretation of what is "probable cause." The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court have defined "proba-
ble cause"
as being present where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of
the arresting officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief to con-
clude that the suspect had committed or is committing a crime. 37
In situations analytically similar to Terry, where an officer is per-
130. Justice Larsen, Chief Justice Nix, Justice McDermott, and a most reluctant Jus-
tice Papadakos comprised the majority. Id at 1178, 1181.
131. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
132. Johnston, 530 A2d at 79 (emphasis added).
133. Johnston, 530 A2d at 79.
134. Id at 80 (emphasis added).
135. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
136. In his dissent, Justice Flaherty wrote, "[tihe Johnston search . . was subjected,
not to a balancing test, but to a determination of probable cause. The police in Johnston
had articulable facts on which they based their belief that" drugs were present. Blouse, 611
A2d at 1181 (Flaherty dissenting).
Justice Zappala, in his dissent, wrote, "[b]ecause there existed articulable facts upon
which to base a finding of probable cause, Article I, section 8 of our State Constitution was
not violated in Johnston." Blouse, 611 A2d at 1183 (Zappala dissenting).
137. Commonwealth v Murray, 460 Pa 53, 331 A2d 414, 417 (1975).
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mitted to make a search predicated on a belief that is something
less than probable cause,"'8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
said that a "police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts reasonably warranted the intrusion."" 9 The court
characterized this level of belief as "reasonable suspicion" based on
objective facts.
140
As noted by Justice Zappala in Commonwealth v Iannaccio,
1
4
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "has consistently interpreted Ar-
ticle I, [s]ection 8 of [the Pennsylvania] Constitution in parallel
with federal court decisions under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, at least as to the meaning of 'probable
cause.' "142 Yet, the United States Supreme Court held,
probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. . . . [I]t does not de-
mand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false.
A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is in-
volved is all that is required.'"
More confusing still is the recent decision in Commonwealth v
Kohl'1" in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that
the Superior Court, in Commonwealth v Quarles, 45  correctly
equated "reasonable grounds" with "probable cause.
'1 46
138. See notes 105-11 and accompanying text for discussion of Terry.
139. Murray, 341 A2d at 418.
140. Id.
141. 505 Pa 414, 480 A2d 966 (1984). Justice Zappala presented the court's opinion in
support of affirmance in an evenly divided court. Iannaccio, 480 A2d at 968. Defendant
sought to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued based on a tip from a confi-
dential police informant. Defendant asserted that the warrant did not meet the requirement
of probable cause and he requested disclosure of the informant's identity to challenge the
veracity of the informant's sworn statement. Id at 968-69. The trial court ordered the pro-
duction of the informant. Id at 969-70. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the
lower court's order finding that it "abused its discretion in finding as a fact that the Com-
monwealth failed to prove the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the
warrant." Id at 970. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, being equally divided, affirmed the
Superior Court's order. Id at 968.
142. Id at 972 n 4.
143. Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 742 (1983).
144. Pa , 615 A2d 308 (1992).
145. 229 Pa Super 363, 324 A2d 452 (1974).
146. Kohl, 615 A2d at 315-16. The supreme court in Kohl said the issue before the
superior court in Quarles was the constitutionality under the state and federal constitutions
of section 1547(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, which authorized seizure and search
of bodily fluids where an officer has "reasonable grounds" to believe that the suspect had
been driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Applying "the basic
principle of statutory construction that the Legislature does not intend to violate the federal
or state constitutions," the Superior Court construed "reasonable grounds" to mean "proba-
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Probable cause is obviously a very slippery concept.1" The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on one hand, appears to call the
concept of probable cause by no other name other than "probable
cause." On the other hand, in its attempts to define what "proba-
ble cause" actually is, the court treads confusingly close to defini-
tions of "reasonable grounds" and "reasonable suspicion."
The second leg the majority used, also taken from Johnston, was
the majority's distinction between two different types of determi-
nations and the appropriateness of using a balancing test. The ma-
jority said that, in Johnston, the court rejected a balancing test to
determine whether a "search" subject to constitutional limitations
occurred because the Johnston search was not analytically similar
to Terry.148 The majority stated that the Johnston court held that
a balancing test was appropriate to determine if full-blown warrant
requirements were necessary, once it was determined that a consti-
tutionally limited search did occur. 4" The Blouse minority rejected
the majority's distinction and maintained that the only acceptable
use of balancing was to determine whether a search that was ana-
lytically similar to Terry was reasonable.1
50
The Blouse majority is accurate when it states that the Johnston
court used a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of
ble cause." Kohl, 615 A2d 315-16.
At issue in Kohl was whether section 1547(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle code is con-
stitutional under the federal and state constitutions when the statute authorized "the
seizure and search of an individual's blood based solely on the fact that the police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the individual was operating a vehicle involved in an acci-
dent" resulting in injury or death. Id at 313. The supreme court distinguished the superior
court decision in Quarles by noting that section 1547(a)(1) of the Vehicle code, at issue in
Quarles, required "probable cause to believe that the suspect was driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or a controlled substance." Id at 315. The supreme court, finding no such
requirement in section 1547(a)(2), held that the tests authorized by section 1547(a)(2) were
violative of the search and seizure provisions of both the federal and state constitutions. Id
at 309-10.
147. Black's Law Dictionary defines "probable cause" as:
[rleasonable cause; having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for
belief in certain alleged facts. A set of probabilities grounded in the factual and prac-
tical considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons
and is more than mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for
conviction.
Black's Law Dictionary 1201 (West, 6th ed 1990) (emphasis added).
148. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1178-79 n 1 citing Johnston, 530 A2d at 79. The Johnston
court found that the canine-sniff search at issue lacked the exigencies of Terry. Blouse, 611
A2d at 1178-79 n 1.
149. Id citing Johnston, 530 A2d at 79.
150. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1181 (Flaherty dissenting); Id at 1183 (Zappala dissenting).
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canine-sniff searches. 15 1 However, the majority's interpretation of
the reason why this test was used is questionable. The majority
said that the balancing test is appropriate for determining the con-
stitutionality of status-violation roadblocks "because the probable
cause requirement would be wholly inadequate to satisfy the goal
sought to be achieved, and there is no other way to obviate this
type of harm."'18 2 Simply put, because the government's interest is
heavy, the probable cause requirement is too burdensome. In the
Johnston decision, however, the court used a balancing test to
evaluate warrantless canine-sniff searches because "the canine sniff
is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure
that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure."' 2 Here, the court uses balancing not just because the
state's interest is great but also because the search at issue is a
search like no other in its limited intrusiveness. A search con-
ducted at a roadblock, not limited in the manner conducted and
the content of information revealed but only limited in scope, can
not seriously be compared to a canine-sniff search, which is a
unique and maximally limited search. Perhaps if a dog could be
trained to detect an expired license by smell, such a comparison
would be warranted.
The third leg the majority relied upon was taken from Tarbert.
The majority parallelled drunk-driving roadblocks, at issue in Tar-
bert, with roadblocks conducted to disclose status violations, at is-
sue in Blouse.154 Significant in Tarbert was the compelling interest
of the public in apprehending drunk drivers, which the Tarbert
court found to be relatively heavier than the minimal intrusion on
the individual. 5 5 The Blouse majority, comparing the two types of
roadblocks, said, "the state has a vital interest in maintaining
highway safety by ensuring that only qualified drivers are permit-
ted to operate motor vehicles, and that their vehicles operate
safely" to prevent the "mass carnage that results from unlicensed
151. In Johnston, the court quoted the United States Supreme Court's balancing anal-
ysis of canine-sniff searches. Johnston, 530 A2d at 77 citing United States v Place, 462 US
696, 707 (1983).
152. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
153. Johnston, 530 A2d at 77 citing Place, 462 US at 707 (emphasis added). "Sui
generis" is defined as "[of] its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its kind; peculiar.
Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (West, 6th ed 1990).
154. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
155. Id referencing Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1041-42.
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drivers and unsafe vehicles occupying the road." 156
The Blouse majority's comparison was crucially weak in provid-
ing support to sustain the claim that status violations significantly
contribute to the "mass carnage" on Pennsylvania highways. The
Tarbert court, in contrast, cited cases indicating the large number
of deaths and serious injuries attributed to alcohol-related acci-
dents in Pennsylvania,187 cited an analysis of the ineffectiveness of
present law enforcement procedures to apprehend drunk drivers,
15 8
and also, cited a federal government study evaluating the effective-
ness of sobriety-checkpoint programs. 8  Moreover, the brief for
the Commonwealth in Blouse did not offer evidence to support the
claim that status violations significantly contribute to the "mass
carnage" on Pennsylvania highways, 160 and the majority merely
glosses over this area. 61
The fourth and final leg the majority used was its reliance on the
Tarbert dicta.1 62 The majority found that the Tarbert plurality up-
held the constitutionality of drunk-driver roadblocks provided the
police substantially complied with the prescribed guidelines.16 The
Blouse majority, failing to acknowledge that the constitutional
analysis of drunk-driver roadblocks in Tarbert was dicta, held that
the analysis carried significant authority. 64 The Blouse minority,
through Justice Flaherty, criticized the majority's use of a gratui-
tously evaluated issue that was not properly before the court.
1 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that language going be-
yond the issue decided must be considered dicta.166 However, the
156. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
157. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1042. "Commonwealth v Mikulan, 504 Pa 244, 470 A2d 1339,
1341 (1983) (800 killed and 19,499 seriously injured in alcohol-related traffic accidents in
Pennsylvania in 1982); Commonwealth v Leninsky, 360 Pa Super 49, 519 A2d 984, 989
(1986) (950 killed in alcohol-related traffic accidents in Pennsylvania in 1981)." Tarbert, 535
A2d at 1042.
158. Id citing Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 10.8(d) at 72-73 (West, 2d ed 1987).
159. Tarbert, 535 A2d at 1042 citing Leninsky, 519 A2d at 990-91 citing Natl Trans-
portation Safety Bd, Deterrence of Drunk Driving: the Role of Sobriety Checkpoints and
Administrative License Revocations (Washington, DC April 3, 1984).
160. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, Commonwealth v Blouse, 611 A2d 1177 (1992).
161. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179. See also note 52 and accompanying text for Justice Zap-
pala's criticism of the majority's reasoning in light of the "minute traffic and equipment
violations" discovered in the Blouse roadblock. Id at 1183.
162. Id at 1179.
163. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179. See note 127 for the Tarbert guidelines.
164. Blouse, 611 A2d at 1179.
165. Id at 1182 (Flaherty dissenting).
166. Steelwagon v Pyle, 390 Pa 17, 133 A2d 819, 823 (1957).
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court has also held that dicta in an opinion can be "as strong and
controlling as a decision on the merits; indeed, [o]pinions contain-
ing dicta are sometimes more carefully and thoroughly considered
than some [o]pinions which are restricted solely to the merits."'
61 7
In comparison, the Tarbert dicta, while extensively analyzing a
constitutional issue not before the court, nevertheless lacks "strong
and controlling" support because of the decision's plurality. More-
over, the Tarbert constitutional evaluation violates the "well-set-
tled principle that [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] should not
decide a constitutional question unless absolutely required to do
SO.
' '~
As described, the Blouse decision rests on four legs: (1) the ma-
jority's interpretation of probable cause; (2) its use of a balancing
test where the probable cause requirement is inadequate to accom-
plish the goal of the state; (3) the parallel it draws between drunk-
driver roadblocks and status-violation roadblocks; and (4) its reli-
ance on Tarbert dicta. In so holding, Pennsylvania is not alone. A
number of other states, including Connecticut, New Jersey, and
New York, have found status-violation roadblocks constitutionally
permissible as well. 1 9 These states generally have found such road-
blocks permissible under their police powers and have minimized
intrusiveness by prescribing guidelines similar to the ones in Tar-
bert.70 The few states in which such roadblocks were held invalid
generally did so by noting arbitrary police procedures in con-
ducting the roadblocks.17 1 It is interesting to note that states, when
determining the constitutionality of drunk-driver roadblocks, gen-
erally cited the lack or existence of empirical data offered as evi-
dence linking drunk driving with vehicle accidents and injuries.17 1
In contrast, when determining the constitutionality of status-viola-
tion roadblocks, states, including Pennsylvania in Blouse, primar-
ily relied on their police powers and prescribed guidelines to mini-
mize the intrusiveness.17 The connection between status violations
and "mass carnage" on our nation's highways does not appear to
be seriously questioned. Is this connection so much more obvious
167. In Re Trust Estate of Paw, 411 Pa 96, 191 A2d 399, 404 (1963), overruled on
other grounds, Estate of Tyler, 474 Pa 148, 377 A2d 157 (1977).
168. Krenzelak v Krenzelak, 503 Pa 373, 469 A2d 987, 991 (1983).
169. See Annotation, Validity of Routine Roadblocks by State or Local Police for
Purpose of Discovery of Vehicular or Driving Violations, 37 ALR4th 10 (1985).
170. Annotation, 37 ALR4th § 2[a] at 15.
171. Id.
172. Id at §§ 3, 4.
173. Id.
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than the connection between drunk driving and vehicle accidents
that we find it unnecessary to even glance at any empirical data?
Martin R. Egna
